This study reports the effects of rebate rules on voluntary contributions to a threshold public good. Rebate rules specify how excess contributions, over the threshold amount are distributed. We examine three rebate rules experimentally: a no rebate policy where excess contributions are discarded, a proportional rebate policy where excess contributions are rebated proportionally to an individual's contribution, and a utilization rebate policy where excess contributions provide some continuous public good. Significantly more Nash equilibrium outcomes are observed under the no rebate treatment than under either of the other two. Interestingly, the variance of contributions differs significantly between rebate treatments.
Introduction
In 1995 the Niagara Mohawk Power Company of New York introduced the Green Choice program. Citizens in upstate New York could opt to join the program by paying an additional fixed fee each month which would be added to their electric bill. Fees would be collected for a twelve month period and, if enough were collected, would be used to build an environmentally friendly energy project. Since this energy project had an associated price tag, a certain minimum number of subscribers to the Green Choice Program were required. If subscriptions fell short of the needed level, the program would be abandoned and the funds previously collected, returned. The Green Choice program is an example of a 1 simplified provision point mechanism designed to fund a threshold public good.
In a provision point mechanism, the size of a proposed project and the associated total cost are predetermined (this cost threshold is referred to in the literature and in this paper as the provision point). Members of the community impacted by the project submit bids stating their dollar commitment to covering the project costs. If the sum of contributions covers the cost of the project, it is funded, otherwise it is not. (See Davis and Holt (1993) and Ledyard (1995) for a description of the provision point mechanism and review of public goods experiments.)
Because individuals receive benefits upon meeting or exceeding the contribution threshold, the provision point mechanism lends itself to potential over contribution. For example, Niagara Mohawk might find that they collect more than the 2 necessary funds to build the renewable energy project. Therefore, users of the mechanism must choose a rule to specify the distribution of any such excess contributions. It is this institutional feature, which we will refer to as the 'rebate rule,' that is explored in this paper.
It is important to distinguish between the feature that we refer to as rebates and the feature of refunds. Refund rules apply when the contribution level is less than the threshold amount and the project is not provided. Isaac et al. (1989) found that subjects contribute more when their contributions are returned in case of nonprovision than they do when those contributions are lost. In contrast, rebate rules apply when the contribution level exceeds the required threshold and the project is provided. Excess funds can be rebated back to contributors according to some prespecified rule. The provision point mechanism itself specifies neither a refund nor a rebate rule. We examine three principal rebate approaches.
The first and simplest is a No Rebate policy in which excess contributions are simply wasted. This wastage can be interpreted literally, as throwing the extra funds into the ocean, or figuratively, when those funds are spent on goods which provide no utility to the contributors. For example, Niagara Mohawk might choose 1 We thank William Schulze for bringing the Niagara Mohawk Green Choice Project to our attention. For more details on this program see Schulze (1995) . 2 This problem recently threatened the city of Seattle, where lottery tickets marketed to finance a new stadium for the Seattle Mariners were selling well above expectation. The lottery was obligated to contribute $3 million toward the cost of the stadium, but in the first eight days of sales, the tickets had raised $582000. If all the year's tickets were sold, the lottery would bring in $3.9 million. The question then became what to do with the surplus. The Associated Press reports that ''[t]he surplus will be paid into the state's general fund...'' quoted from ClariNet e.News! (1996) . to use excess contributions for decorating the offices of their employees. Since the money is essentially lost from the perspective of the contributors, the No Rebate policy involves the strictest marginal penalties for over contribution. Any over contribution in this setting is wasted, and thus inefficient.
The second rebate rule is a Proportional Rebate policy, in which excess contributions are distributed back to contributors in proportion to their individual contributions. For example, Niagara Mohawk could rebate any overcontributions proportionally to the contributors. This rule involves weaker marginal penalties for over contribution than does the No Rebate policy, and the individual's penalty varies with the amount contributed by each individual and by the group. Any over contribution in this setting is transferred between players, and is thus neutral in terms of efficiency.
The third rebate rule is the Utilization Rebate rule in which excess contributions are used to provide more of the public good in a continuous manner. For example, 3 Niagara Mohawk could use excess contributions to plant trees. While the Utilization rebate policy involves some penalties for over contribution, they are not nearly as harsh as the No Rebate policy, and, for the parameter values set and contributions observed in this study, are generally smaller than the penalties from the Proportional Rebate policy. Since over contributions in this setting are used to provide a continuous public good, they represent efficiency gains.
With the parameter values we choose, and under all three rebate policies, the provision point mechanism game has the same continuum of efficient Nash equilibria in which the provision point is exactly met. Each such equilibrium in the continuum specifies how the costs of providing the public good are divided among the contributors.
However, the set of pareto-efficient outcomes are different under the three rebate policies, although these outcomes are not always equilibria. Under No Rebate, excess contributions are wasted, thus the set of pareto-efficient outcomes involve no such contributions. Under Proportional Rebate, excess contributions are redistributed to contributors, thus they have no impact on social welfare (they are just transfers). Under Utilization Rebate, excess contributions are used to provide more of a public good, thus they enhance social welfare.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature in provision point public goods. In Section 3 we discuss the game and various rebate mechanisms. Section 4 describes the experimental parameters and procedures. Section 5 outlines some conjectures while Section 6 presents the experimental results and analysis. Section 7 concludes.
Previous literature
The theory of a provision point mechanism used to fund public goods provision 3 In fact, the current version of the Green Choice Program involves a very similar provision.
was presented by Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) . This section reviews the related experimental work in the provision of discrete public goods. This work can be divided into two categories, those involving discrete and continuous contributions. Van de Kragt et al. (1983) first investigated the provision of threshold public goods where individual contributions were all-or-nothing. In their canonical experiment, subjects are given a voucher worth $5 and organized into groups of seven. If three subjects out of the seven (in another treatment, five subjects out of the seven) choose to contribute their voucher to the group, every group member receives a bonus of $10. This experimental design involved no refund (if a subject contributed but the public good was not provided (s)he lost the contribution), and no rebate (if more than the required number contributed the payoff was the same). In the baseline treatments, 65% of the groups in this experiment funded the public good (22 out of 34). Of those groups, 55% over contributed (12 out of 22). The main experimental treatment in this paper was the addition of communication, which increased the contribution rate significantly.
Discrete contributions
In a follow-up study, Dawes et al. (1986) compared these results with those from a money-back guarantee treatment where, if the provision point was not met contributions were returned. This is similar to the feature of refund investigated in Isaac et al. (1989) . In the Dawes et al. (1986) paper, this feature did not significantly increase contributions. In a second treatment, if the public good were provided, all subjects would be 'forced' to contribute their voucher retroactively. This treatment increased contributions significantly. The inclusion of a moneyback guarantee was later investigated by Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989) . They used a within-subjects design in which subjects were organized into groups of five, and played three blocks of 25 trials (75 rounds). In their experiment, the money-back guarantee had a significant positive effect on the proportion of 4 individuals contributing.
Additional discrete-contribution experiments have utilized heterogeneous endowments among subjects (Rapoport, 1988; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991) and addressed sequential contributions rather than simultaneous ones (Erev and Rapoport, 1990; Au et al., 1996) . All of these experiments involve no refund and no rebate.
Although some discrete contribution experiments involved a refund feature in the form of a money-back guarantee, none included a rebate. In the case of over contribution, any excess contributions were lost.
Continuous contributions
This subsection reviews papers which investigate the provision of threshold 5 public goods where individual contributions are continuous. Although the very first public goods experiments involve a series of provision points (Marwell and Ames, 1979 , 1980 , 1981 , the two earliest papers which controlled the payoff function carefully are Isaac et al. (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991) . Isaac et al. (1989) modified the Isaac et al. (1984) framework by adding a provision point. Subjects are organized into groups of four and high, medium and low provision points included 100% of total token endowment, 87% of total token endowments and 44% of total token endowments. Contributions over and above the provision point continue to produce a public good, thus this experiment includes what we have termed a Utilization Rebate. This public goods game is run both with and without a money-back guarantee (refund) provision. The existence of the refund provision significantly increased contributions. With a refund, subjects managed to provide the public good 57% of the time in the high provision point condition, 53% of the time in the medium condition, and 43% of the time in the low condition. However, very little Nash equilibrium play was observed in this experiment, only 3% of outcomes in the medium condition involved Nash equilibria, while 0% in the low condition did.
In contrast, Bagnoli and McKee (1991) found significantly more Nash equilibrium play in their experiment with a refund but with what we have termed a No Rebate provision. In groups of size 5, the public good was provided in 86.7% of the rounds and the Nash equilibrium played 54.1% of the rounds (pooled over 6 homogeneous and heterogeneous valuations and endowments). Bagnoli and McKee (1991) report subjects playing the efficient Nash equilibrium (in which the provision point is exactly met) 54% of the time. In the Isaac et al. (1989) medium provision-point sessions (the ones most comparable with Bagnoli and McKee, 1991 , and this study) only 3% of the observations are Nash equilibria. There are many procedural differences between the two studies; group sizes, average net earnings from the public good, framing of the instructions and informational environments. In addition, in the case of Isaac et al. (1989) a Utilization Rebate was used, while in Bagnoli and McKee (1991) , No Rebate was used.
Although the set of Nash equilibria was similar in these two experiments, the set of pareto-efficient outcomes was different. In particular, in Bagnoli and McKee (1991) , the Nash equilibrium outcomes were also pareto-efficient, while in Isaac et al. (1989) pareto-efficient outcomes involved contributions in excess of the equilibrium level to the public good.
In this study, the No Rebate policy had significantly higher equilibrium play than the Utilization Rebate did, which is consistent with the difference in results between Bagnoli and McKee (1991) and Isaac et al. (1989) with respect to 7 equilibrium play. The goal of this paper is to isolate the effects of the use of alternative rebate policies.
Rebates
Given the observed over contribution in the provision of threshold public goods, the rebate feature seems to be an important part of the mechanism. While previous experiments have utilized various rebates, this study is the first systematic investigation of the effects of alternative rebate rules on the provision of public goods. An understanding of these effects will help to organize the previous literature.
The idea of rebates is first discussed in Smith (1980) who presents an experiment using two rebate options in the investigation of an auction mechanism for public goods provision. Unfortunately, he does not report differences between the alternate rebate mechanism. In their theoretical development, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) suggest that rebate policies should have the property that an increase in contribution of $1 by individual i should not generate a refund to 8 individual i of more than $1. All three policies we examine have this property. This paper offers three important contributions. First, it explores an institutional feature of voluntary public goods provision, the rebate feature, which has not yet been investigated. Knowledge of the importance of this feature will aid economists in furthering their understanding of public goods mechanisms and policy makers in selecting policy implementations. Second, it offers further experimental evidence of the usefulness of the provision point mechanism for providing public goods. 7 More recent provision point mechanism experiments with continuous contributions assume particular rebate rules without isolating their effects. For example, experiments without rebates include Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) who investigate heterogeneous valuation for the public good in a repeated setting, Rondeau et al. (1996) who do the same in a one-shot setting, Asch et al. (1993) who compare a continuous public good with a threshold public good, Cadsby and Maynes (forthcoming); Cadsby and Maynes (1996) who examine the effect of different subject pools on contribution behavior, Coats and Gronberg (1996) who examine a sequential mechanism for provision of a threshold public good with and without a refund and Bagnoli et al. (1992) who examine a multi-unit version of the provision point mechanism with a refund. Experiments with rebates include Dorsey (1992) who uses a Utilization Rebate but allows his subjects to continuously and publicly 'pledge' varying amounts to the public good (no refund), and Johnson (1996) who uses a Proportional Rebate and a refund provision in his discrete public goods experiments examining heterogeneous valuations.
8 If this condition is violated, a new equilibrium exists in which everyone give all their income to the public good, in order to capture the benefits from the rebate. Thus there is no longer a public goods 'problem' which is the focus of this investigation.
And third, the results of this study help to explain discrepancies among existing provision point mechanism studies, especially between Isaac et al. (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991) .
The game and rebate mechanisms
Imagine a group of size N, in which each individual has an endowment E , and a is not provided and all contributions are refunded (money-back guarantee).
Individual payoffs in this game differ with the different rebate policies. The individual payoff functions (p ) and associated marginal costs of over contribution i for the three policies are derived below.
No rebate policy
Under the no rebate policy, any contributions to the public good over the provision point disappear. Thus if the public good is provided (with or without excess funds), each player receives the payoff from their private consumption, and their value (v ) for the public good. If the public good is not provided, i contributions are returned and players receive payoff from their private consumption only. The marginal penalty associated with over contribution imposed on individual i is calculated by the partial derivative
implying that the additional unit of endowment contributed to the public good beyond the provision point level (PP) by individual i is wasted. It may help to think of making excess contributions in the No Rebate treatment as a negative-sum activity; no player receives benefit from the excess contributions, and the player who made them is worse off. The set of efficient outcomes under this policy are those in which the provision point is exactly met, and os 5 PP. 
Proportional rebate policy
Under this rebate policy if the public good is provided, players receive payoff from their private consumption of their remaining endowment as well as their value for the public good. In addition, they receive a share of any excess contributions for private consumption. Their share is set equal to the proportion of their contribution to the public good. If the public good is not provided, players again receive payoff from privately consuming their endowment.
The marginal penalty associated with over contribution is
The marginal penalty for over contribution under the proportional rebate policy 9 changes over the range of individual and group contributions. It may help to think of making excess contributions in the Proportional Rebate treatment as a constantsum activity; excess contributions can be characterized as transfers from the player who made them to the other players in his group. The set of efficient outcomes under this policy are any in which the provision point is met or exceeded, and o s $ PP. 
Utilization rebate policy
Under the utilization rebate policy, contributions generated over and above those necessary for provision of the public good are used to provide more of a similar but continuous public good. In the Green Choice Program, for example, funds raised in excess of those needed to construct the project could be used to 9 Under this rebate mechanism, an extra token contributed by player i is not wasted (as in the No Rebate treatment) but instead redistributed among all the players in proportion to their contributions. Although an individual's payoff from his contribution of an extra token is negative, the other players in his group receive positive payoff from his over contribution. To see this we only need note that 
If the public good is provided each player receives in addition to the payoff from their private consumption and their value for the public good, their value from the utilization rebate (zero when the provision point is exactly reached and os 5 PP, positive otherwise). The marginal penalty associated with over contribution is calculated by the same derivative, but now has the form
implying that while a marginal unit of endowment allocated to the public good over the level of PP is not wasted, it nonetheless would be better spent in private consumption whenever w #1. This condition is exactly the one discussed in i Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) ; that an increase in contribution of one unit by individual i should not generate a refund or value to individual i of more than one unit.
Under this rebate treatment, if w #1 and o w $ 1, over contribution can be i i viewed as voluntary contribution to a continuous public good. Making excess contributions in the Utilization Rebate treatment under this parameterization is a positive-sum activity; excess contributions do make the group as a whole better off, albeit at the expense of the contributor. The set of efficient outcomes under this policy are those which involve full contribution. Fig. 1 shows the aggregate earnings of a group under different rebate policies. When group contributions are strictly less than the provision point, the group earns o E (everyone consumes their own endowment). When group contributions are i exactly equal to the provision point, the group earns the sum of their valuations for the public good, plus any remaining private consumption.
Efficient outcomes of the game
In contrast, when group contributions are above the provision point, group earnings in the three treatments diverge. In the No Rebate treatment, additional contributions are lost, thus group earnings fall one-to-one with excess contributions. In the Proportional Rebate treatment, additional contributions are redistributed back to the contributors, thus group earnings remain constant with excess contributions. In the Utilization Rebate treatment, additional contributions are used Given these differences, why would a policy maker choose a Proportional or No Rebate treatment over a Utilization rebate treatment (which always yields at least as much surplus)? The answer is behavioral. If Proportional or No Rebate policies are significantly more successful at providing the public good, then their additional benefit may outweigh the costs of inefficiencies in excess contributions. Section 6.2 explicitly address this question.
Equilibria of the game
The set of Nash equilibria in this game are the same under any of the three rebate policies. In each game there exists a continuum of efficient Nash equilibria in which the players contribute exactly enough to achieve the provision point and provide the public good (o s 5 PP). These equilibria have the same group i contribution level, and are not pareto-rankable. They are distinct from one another only in the cost-sharing rule used to divide the costs of the public good among the participants.
It is important to note that under both No Rebate and Proportional Rebate rules these equilibria are also efficient outcomes (although only weakly under Proportional Rebate). However under Utilization Rebate, these equilibria are not efficient outcomes, in this case additional contributions are efficiency-improving. In addition, there are a continuum of pareto-dominated equilibria of this stage game in which the provision point is not met and the public good is not provided. These will be characterized more explicitly below.
Experimental parameters and procedures
All sessions of the experiment were performed in a non-computerized laboratory at Texas A&M University. Each of the three rebate policy treatments involved four experimental sessions of one group of five subjects (N55). Each session involved subjects playing the public goods game repeatedly for 25 periods, and the length of each session was commonly known.
In each period, all individuals were endowed with 55 tokens (E 555). Subjects i were asked to divide their endowment between two types of accounts: a Private Account and a Group Account. The group account parallels contributing toward providing the public good (their contribution to the group account is s ). The i private account parallels private consumption. For each token allocated to their private account, a subject received 1¢ per token. Tokens allocated to the group account were totalled and compared with the provision point of 125 tokens (PP5125). Each subject's value for the public good was v 550¢. Thus each subject i received 50¢ if the provision point was reached by the group. If it was not reached, each subject received their contribution (s ) back. These tokens were retroactively i invested in the private account and earned 1¢ per token.
In the event of a surplus of tokens in the group account, the rebate feature specifies their distribution. The marginal value for the continuous public good in the utilization rebate treatment was w 52/N; thus in that treatment each individual i received 0.4¢ for each token allocated to the group account above and beyond 125.
10
Notice that w #1 and (o w $ 1), as discussed above.
i i
With these parameter values we can calculate the marginal penalties from over contribution in each of the three treatments. As before, in the No Rebate treatment the marginal cost to an individual of over contribution by one token is ≠p i ] 5 2 1 . ≠s i 10 This value for w is equal to the ratio of the value to the cost of the threshold public good. The i cost of the public good is 125 tokens while the return from it is 250 tokens divided equally among the participants.
In the Proportional Rebate treatment that marginal cost is
where this cost is bounded between 0 and 21 and depends on any given subject's contribution to the group account as a proportion of the total amount contributed. Finally, in the Utilization Rebate treatment the marginal cost of over contribution by one token is
Under a very broad range of contribution distributions, the marginal penalty from over contribution in the Proportional Rebate treatment falls between those in the No Rebate and Utilization Rebate treatments (between 21 and 20.6). Of the 500 individual decisions made in the Proportional Rebate treatment of this 11 experiment, the penalty fell outside this range only 15 times (3%).
All experimental instructions were written so that they conform to language developed by Isaac et al. (1984) . All language referring to 'investments' or 'contributions' was intentionally avoided and replaced by words such as 'allocation' of tokens. Instructions are available upon request from the authors. Common information was established by reading instructions out loud and using an overhead projector. After each decision period the total Group Account allocation was announced verbally and was displayed on an overhead.
The set of efficient equilibria of the stage game involve each group of five subjects allocating exactly 125 tokens to the group account. Additionally, this stage game has a unique symmetric efficient equilibrium in which each of the five members of the group allocates 25 tokens to the group account. Previous research suggests that this equilibria may serve as a focal point (see Schelling, 1960 ) and the frequency of its occurrence will be analyzed below.
The stage game also has a continuum of inefficient equilibria, in which the 12 public good is not provided.
11 Furthermore, those 15 decisions are all attributable to three subjects. These three subjects consistently contributed more to the public good than their valuation for it. That is, they repeatedly contributed more than 50 tokens to the public account.
12 There are a number of pareto-dominated equilibria in which somewhere between 0 and 93 tokens are allocated to the group account, but no player wants to unilaterally supplement the account to achieve the provision point. Thus all tokens are returned to the players who are then indifferent between any allocation. An example of this equilibrium is a vector of allocations to the group account like (16, 16, 16, 16, 16 ) (an asymmetric example is (6, 14, 19, 20, 21) ). Here 80 tokens have been allocated, but no one player both can and wants to contribute 45 tokens to unilaterally supplement the group account to achieve 125. No equilibrium of this sort exists in which 94-124 tokens are contributed, and only six instances of this equilibrium were observed out of the 300 group decisions.
Hypotheses and informal conjectures

Group contributions
The set of Nash equilibria in the public goods game under each of these three rebate mechanisms are the same. While the efficient Nash equilibria predictions do not generate a unique cost sharing rule, they do generate a unique aggregate contribution level, which our first conjecture suggests we will observe.
Conjecture 1 (NE): Groups in all treatments will play an efficient Nash equilibrium, thus the aggregate level of contributions will equal the provision point level of contributions (PP5125) in all three rebate treatments.
Although Conjecture 1 describes the set of Nash equilibria of the game, groups may find it difficult to coordinate on a particular equilibrium out of the set. If this coordination failure is prevalent we might expect Conjecture 1 to be invalidated. However, economic theory makes few predictions of what will occur in place of equilibrium behavior.
A second conjecture thus competes with Conjecture 1. It suggests that the magnitude of the marginal penalty associated with over contribution affects the behavior of groups, thus contributions should be greater when the penalty is lower. For our three treatments, then, Conjecture 2: Groups in the Utilization Rebate treatment will have higher levels of contributions than groups in the Proportional Rebate treatment, who will have similarly higher levels of contributions than groups in the No Rebate treatment.
This conjecture is also consistent with the idea that participants care about group earnings as well as individual earnings. Under Utilization Rebate, excess contributions are pareto improving, thus subjects might be more likely to make them than under Proportional Rebate (where excess contributions are pareto-neutral) or under No Rebate (where excess contribution are pareto-disimproving).
Another conjecture suggests that the frequency of equilibria we observe will depend on the penalties for deviating from those equilibria. Since the No Rebate policy creates the largest penalty for over contribution, we might expect subjects in this treatment to deviate the least from the efficient Nash equilibrium contribution level. The Utilization Rebate policy with the smallest penalty for over contribution should generate the weakest focus on the efficient Nash equilibrium contribution level. Conjecture 3 is consistent with the previously-noted differences in the frequency of Nash equilibrium play between Isaac et al. (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991) .
Conjecture 3: Groups in the No Rebate treatment are more likely to play an efficient Nash equilibrium than groups in the Proportional Rebate treatment. Groups in the Proportional Rebate treatment are more likely to play an efficient Nash equilibrium than groups in the Utilization Rebate treatment.
Individual contributions
Although the provision point game examined here has a continuum of Nash equilibria, it also has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which each of the five members of the group allocates 25 tokens to the group account. This equilibrium may serve as a focal point for the players, especially in treatments with higher penalties for miscoordination. The No Rebate treatment has the highest penalty, and the Utilization Rebate treatment the lowest. Thus we would expect a higher proportion of players playing their part of the unique symmetric efficient Nash equilibrium in the No Rebate treatment, and a lower proportion in the Utilization Rebate treatment.
Conjecture 4: The proportion of players playing their part of the unique symmetric efficient Nash equilibrium will be higher in the No Rebate treatment than in the Proportional Rebate treatment and similarly higher in the Proportional Rebate treatment than in the Utilization Rebate treatment.
Convergence
Finally, we can look at group data over time. Although economic theory suggests subjects will play the Nash equilibrium, in practice such equilibria are not as much played as they are arrived at or converged toward. In this experiment the stage game was repeated 25 times. We might think subjects coordinate on a particular efficient Nash equilibrium over time.
Conjecture 5: Group contributions approach the Nash equilibrium outcome of 125 tokens in all three treatments.
The next section presents the results of the experiment and addresses Conjectures 1-5.
Results and analysis
Figs. 2-4 show the total contributions for each period in each session by treatment. 
Group contributions
This subsection provides analysis of group contributions to the public good. Table 1 displays summary statistics for group contribution levels of the three treatments.
Clearly, groups do not always arrive at a Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, the Nash equilibrium prediction does a good job of organizing the data in the Proportional and No Rebate treatments. To show this we run a random effects 13 The random effects model corrects for covariance in the error term caused by multiple observations from a single group of subjects. Unless reported otherwise, regressions use two-factor random effects models. The first factor is the group to which the observation belongs, the second factor is the period in which the outcome was observed. Comparisons are thus between treatments controlling for changes in behavior over time. See Greene (1990) for a discussion of random effects regression.
14 Two other statistical tests of these hypotheses lead to the same conclusion. Both involve finding each group's average contribution over 25 periods. Thus each treatment is summarized into four independent observations. A t-test with three degrees of freedom on these four observations fails to reject the hypotheses that average contributions 5125 in the Proportional and No Rebate treatments (t520. 10, Pr.utu50.9277; t522.07, Pr.utu50.1305, respectively) . However, we can reject the hypothesis that average contributions 5125 in the Utilization Rebate treatment (t55.30, Pr.utu5 0.0131). Using the same four observations per treatment, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test produces qualitatively similar results. See Siegel (1956) for a description of the Wilcoxon test. treatment are significantly higher than the equilibrium contribution of 125 tokens (mixed support for Conjecture 1).
The results from the regression reported in Table 2 can also be used to test the competing Conjecture 2, that higher contributions will be observed in treatments with lower penalties for over contribution. That conjecture cannot be supported for the comparison between the Proportional and No Rebate treatments, where contributions are not distinguishable from one another (the PR coefficient is not significantly different from zero). However, contributions in the Utilization Rebate 15 treatment are significantly higher than those in the other two conditions. This mixed support is summarized in Observation 2.
Observation 2: Average contributions in the Proportional and No Rebate treatments are not statistically distinguishable from each other. However, average contributions in the Utilization Rebate treatment are significantly higher than in either of the other two (mixed support for Conjecture 2).
The main results from this analysis suggest there is a significant difference between contributions in the Utilization Rebate treatment, where the efficient outcome is full contribution, and the other two treatments, where the Nash equilibrium outcome is itself efficient. These differences suggest that the rebate used has a significant impact on contribution behavior.
One particularly salient feature of the data are the different variances of contributions in the three treatments. Two sorts of variance are of interest in this analysis. The first is the extent to which groups within a treatment differ from each other. Figs. 2-4 suggest that the four groups in the Utilization Rebate treatment differ more from each other than the four groups in the No Rebate treatment in any given period. Another random effects model using GLS is run to test the significance of this sort of variance.
The dependent variable is constructed to capture the spread of the groups. For each treatment in each period, we calculate the average contribution of the four groups. Each group's squared distance from this average is then calculated and used as the dependent variable. The independent variables were the same dummies from the previous regression (NR5regression constant, PR and UR). Regression output is presented in Table 3 . 15 For comparison with the No Rebate treatment it is enough to observe that the UR coefficient is significantly different from zero. A separate comparison with the Proportional Rebate treatment suggests significant difference as well (F(1,9)531.19, Prob.F 50.0003). If each group's contributions are averaged over time, producing four independent observations per treatment, a two-tailed Wilcoxon test cannot distinguish between contributions in the Proportional and No Rebate treatments (U 56, p50.686). However, the same test rejects the null hypothesis of similarity between the Utilization and Proportional Rebate treatments (U 50, p50.028) and between the Utilization and No Rebate treatments (U 50, p50.028). These results support the hypothesis that the variances in the three treatments are ordered by the penalty for over contribution. The No Rebate treatment clearly has the least variance of the three treatments. The Proportional Rebate dummy is (almost) significantly different from zero at the 5% level, suggesting that the variance in that treatment is higher than the variance in the No Rebate treatment. The Utilization Rebate dummy is significantly different from zero, and a comparison of the Proportional and Utilization Rebate coefficients suggest the variances in those two treatments differ as well (F(1,9)540.99, Prob.F 5 0.0001).
The second sort of variance which may be of interest is the variance of a group's contributions over time. For each group in each treatment we calculate the variance of their contributions over 25 periods. With four independent data points in each treatment, a Mann-Whitney U test provides pairwise comparisons. Given the previous results, a one-tailed test was used. Groups move more in the Proportional than in the No Rebate treatments (U 52, p50.057) , and more in the Utilization than in the Proportional Rebate treatments (U 50, p50.014) .
Both these measures of variance suggest Observation 3. This result was not hypothesized, but is consistent with some post hoc analysis 16 of adaptive learning theories. We reserve a full discussion of learning theories in this game to another paper.
Proportions of success and Nash equilibria
This subsection provides an analysis of the frequencies of successful provisions of the public good and Nash equilibria played in each of the three treatments. The provision point is met and the public good funded slightly more than half the time in all three treatments (see Table 1 ). These proportions of successful provision are not significantly different from each other. To show this we calculate the proportions of successful provisions of each group over 25 periods. A two-tailed Wilcoxon test compares the four independent data points in each treatment, and finds no significant differences between any pairwise comparison (NR vs. PR: U 56.5, p50.786; PR vs. UR: U 55, p50.468; NR vs. UR: U 56.5, p50.786 ).
Observation 4: Although subjects achieve the provision point only slightly more than half the time, the frequency with which the public good is provided does not vary with the rebate mechanism.
Originally we suggested that a policy maker's choice of rebate mechanisms should balance the expected frequency of successful provision with the different social welfare implications of excess contributions. For example, while the Utilization Rebate involves at least as much social welfare as the other rebates (see Fig. 1 ), if it were significantly less successful in providing the public good, the policy maker may choose another rebate instead. We see here that this is not the case. Instead, the proportion of successful provision is the same in all three treatments, thus in terms of social welfare the Utilization Rebate treatment dominates the other two.
However, the proportion of equilibrium outcomes observed (that is, the proportion of times the public good is exactly provided) does differ between the treatments. That proportion is significantly higher in the No Rebate treatment than in either of the other two (see Table 1 ). A similar construction as described above provides four independent observations per treatment of the proportion of times the public good is exactly funded. The same two-tailed Wilcoxon test finds an almost significant difference between those proportions in the Proportional and No Rebate treatment (U 51, p50.058) and a significant difference between the Utilization and No Rebate treatment (U 50, p50.028) . No difference is found between the proportions of Nash equilibria played between the Proportional and Utilization Rebate treatments (U 55.5, p50.586) . This result provides partial support for Conjecture 3, which suggested that treatments with higher penalties for over contribution will have a higher incidence of Nash equilibrium play.
Observation 5: The proportion of equilibrium outcomes are significantly higher in the No Rebate treatment than in either of the other two (mixed support for Conjecture 3). This observation also addresses the differences between previous experimental results of Bagnoli and McKee (1991) and of Isaac et al. (1989) . Bagnoli and McKee (1991) used a no-rebate structure in their experiment and find strong support for the Nash equilibrium (for group sizes of five, 54% of their observations are Nash equilibria). In contrast, Isaac et al. (1989) use a utilization rebate structure, and find only 3% Nash equilibrium play in their medium threshold treatment.
Summary of group data
Using data at the group level there are a number of important conclusions we can draw. Contributions are significantly higher under the Utilization Rebate rule than under either of the other two rules (mixed support for Conjecture 2). The variance of contributions is significantly different under all three rules; highest in the Utilization Rebate treatment (with the lowest penalties for over contribution) and lowest in the No Rebate treatment (with the highest penalties). Subjects clearly do not play a Nash equilibrium in each round of the three treatments, but on average group contributions cannot be distinguished from Nash equilibrium play in either the No Rebate or Proportional Rebate treatments (mixed support for Conjecture 1). Although there are no differences in the proportion of successes between the three treatments, we observe significantly more Nash equilibrium play in the No Rebate treatment than in the other two (Conjecture 3). This result is consistent with the high levels of equilibrium play observed by Bagnoli and McKee (1991) (who used no rebates) and the low levels observed by Isaac et al. (1989) (who used a utilization rebate).
Individual contribution data
The discussion above refers to total group contribution levels in each period and does not address how contributions are distributed among group members. Conjecture 4 suggests that individual contributions will be differentially consistent with a symmetric cost-sharing rule in different treatments. Given that endowments and valuations are homogeneous, and that this is common information, the symmetric cost-sharing rule is transparent and provides a potentially strong focal point.
The overall proportions of symmetric equilibrium contributions in the No Rebate treatment is 0.508, in the Proportional Rebate treatment is 0.284 and in the Utilization Rebate treatment is 0.074. To show the statistical differences between these proportions, we calculate for each individual in the experiment the proportion of times they played their part of the symmetric equilibrium. With 20 observations in each treatment (one for each individual) we use a one-tailed Wilcoxon test to test Conjecture 4. The proportion of individuals playing the symmetric equilibrium strategy is significantly lower in the Proportional than in the No Rebate treatment (U 5127, p#0.025) and that proportion is significantly lower in the Utilization than in the Proportional Rebate treatment (U 5132, p#0.05).
Observation 6: The proportion of subjects playing their part of the symmetric equilibrium is highest in the No Rebate treatment and lowest in the Utilization Rebate treatment, with the Proportional Rebate treatment falling in between (support for Conjecture 4).
This observation provides strong support for Conjecture 4, which completely ordered the three treatments as to the proportion of individual Nash equilibrium play expected as a function of the penalty from over contribution in each treatment. Finally, we examine whether groups converged toward an efficient Nash equilibrium during the experimental session (Conjecture 5). First we calculate the squared distance between the group contribution and the equilibrium outcome of 125 tokens in each period for each group. Diff125 becomes the dependent variable in three one-way random effects GLS regressions (one for each treatment). Independent variables are the period and the period squared. Table 4 presents the   17 results of these regressions.
If groups are converging toward 125 tokens we should observe a significant and negative effect of period on squared deviation from equilibrium outcomes. A significant coefficient (of any sign) on period squared suggests that the convergence is nonlinear. In all three treatments, both these coefficients are significantly different than zero. The negative coefficients on period suggest groups converge toward the group contribution of 125 over the course of the game. The positive coefficients on period squared suggests the convergence slows over the course of the game. This result supports Conjecture 5.
Observation 7: In all three treatments, groups converge toward 125 (support for Conjecture 5).
Summary and conclusions
This research explores the rebate feature of voluntary public goods provision. The investigation concludes that selection of the rebate policy has a significant impact on the frequency of equilibrium play, individual behavior and total contribution levels.
We find contributions to be significantly higher when excess contributions are utilized (Utilization Rebate treatment) than when they are rebated to contributors proportionally (Proportional Rebate treatment) or wasted (No Rebate treatment) (Observation 2). In the latter two treatments average contribution levels cannot be distinguished from the efficient Nash equilibrium contribution level, while contributions are significantly higher than Nash levels in the Utilization Rebate treatment (Observation 1). Even though average contributions in the Utilization Rebate treatment are higher, the proportion of times the public good is actually funded is not significantly different between the three treatments (Observation 4). This result is driven by the significantly different variances between the three rebate mechanisms, highest when the penalty for over contribution is lowest in Utilization Rebate, and lowest when the penalty for over contribution is highest in No Rebate (Observation 3). These variances reflect the underlying penalties from over contribution in each of the three treatments.
This result suggests that policy makers should implement a Utilization Rebate whenever possible in these settings, since the proportion of successful provision is as high, and contributions higher, than the other two treatments. In addition, these higher contributions have the potential to generate more of a continuous public good, which raises social welfare overall.
The proportion of equilibria played was significantly higher in the No Rebate treatment than in either of the other two treatments (Observation 5). This result helps clarify key design features which differed between the studies of Bagnoli and McKee (1991) (who observed 54% Nash equilibrium play under a No Rebate rule) and Isaac et al. (1989) (who observed 3% Nash equilibrium play under a Utilization Rebate rule), as well as other, more recent studies. Finally, contributions converge toward the Nash equilibrium outcome in all three treatments (Observation 7).
The results of this experiment suggest that rebate features do not influence the proportion of successful provisions of threshold public goods. However, if the objective is to maximize contribution levels or amount of public good provided, a Utilization Rebate mechanism is more productive. On the other hand, if the objective is to minimize the variance of contributions or increase the frequency of equitable cost-sharing, a No Rebate procedure is preferable.
These results provide information on the importance of the rebate feature. We hope it will aid economists in furthering their understanding of decentralized public goods mechanisms, as well as help policy makers in selecting policy implementations of provision point mechanisms.
